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Abstract 
This paper estimates the impact of different categories of employment policy interventions on job-seekers' subsequent 
experience. We generate a range of estimates to help us distinguish programme effects from selection effects. We also 
examine the robustness of our findings for a range of sub-populations. There is limited variation in programme effects 
for people with different observed characteristics. Some evidence suggests that programme effecTiveness may be 
coullfercyclical. 
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Each year, the New Zealand government spends around 
$600m on labour market policies to improve the job pros-
pects of unemployed or disadvantaged job-seekers. This 
paper investigates one important dimension of how these 
policies change job-seekers' prospects. The paper anal y-
ses administrative records collected by the New Zealand 
Employment Service (NZES) to learn about the effect that 
job-seekers' receipt of labour market assistance has on their 
subsequent contact with NZES. We consider tive differ-
ent types of assistance, and estimate separately the effects 
on job-seekers with different observable characteristics. 
Methods 
Ideally (at least from a researcher's perspective), people 
would be assigned randomly to interventions, so that any 
difference in outcomes could be attributed to the effects 
of the intervention. Such an approach to evaluating the 
effectiveness of interventions is described as 'experimen-
tal'. Because of the random selection, there would be no 
reason to expect average outcomes to be different for those 
who received assistance and those who did not. For a range 
of practical and ethical reasons, there is no history of reli-
able experimental evaluations in New Zealand, although 
the approach is widely used in other countries, notably the 
USA.' 
The approach taken in this paper is to use what are termed 
'quasi-experimental methods' to control for the fact that 
expected outcomes for those who receive assistance are 
likely to be different from expected outcomes for those 
who do not receive assistance, regardless of the impact of 
the assistance. The logic of targetting assistance to those 
most in need, which has been a strong theme in New Zea-
land labour market policies, makes such differences al-
most inevitable. 
Our aim in this paper is to evaluate the impact of a pro-
gramme in terms of the ··effect of the treatment on the 
treated''- i.e. : compare the outcome for an individual who 
received assistance with the outcome that that individual 
would have experienced had he or she not received assist-
ance. Obviously, we do not observe the same individual 
both receiving assistance and not receiving assistance, and 
this is the central identification problem for the evalua-
tion. 
Table 1 illustrates the identification problem. The shaded 
areas show the outcomes that we do not observe directly. 
The first is the outcome that would have occurred in the 
absence of assistance, for those who receive assistance. 
The second is the outcome that would occur following 
assistance, for those who do not receive assistance. The 
true measure of the effect of treatment on the treated is the 
difference between the two cells in the first row: 
( I ) 
The individuals who receive the treatment may be quite 
different from those who do not, and the difference in ob-
served outcomes EfY,J..Q; = 1) - E[Y;JQ; ll may be due 
to these differences rather than to the effect of treatment. 
The term 'selection bias' is used to describe the difference 
between the true a (see equation 1) and the difference in 
observed outcomes. 
Because we do not observe E[Y;, - Y ;ol D; = 1}, we need to 
impose some plausible but essentially untestable assump-
tions in order to get an estimate of it.2 In the results pre-
sented below, we present three different estimates of pro-
gramme effects, w~ich ref1ect alternative assumptions: 
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• T bl 1 M a e • f .bl atrax 0 pOSSI t e ou comes 
Outcome if Outcome if 
treatment is not treatment is 
received (Yio) received (Yu) 
Individuals E[YiO I Di =1] E[Yii iDi=l] 
who receive 
treatment 
(Di' 1) 
Individuals E[Yio I Di =0] E[Yil I o, =0] 
who do not 
receive 
treatment 
(Di' 0 ) 
No1a1ion: 
i denoles an individual 
E/AIB/ denotes the expected value of variable A given 
that event B occurs. 
a) na'ive estimator: the difference in observed outcomes 
between those who do receive assistance (the ' treatment 
group') and those who do not (the ·comparison group'). 
b) regression estimator: the difference in outcomes between 
the treatment and comparison groups. controlling for the 
re lationship between observable characteristics and ex-
pected outcomes, as estimated by linear regression. 
c) propensity estimator: the difference in outcomes between 
the treatment and comparison groups, controlling for the 
relationship between observable characteristics and the 
probability (propensity) of selection, estimated semi-
parametrically. 
These methods will be explained by example in the text 
below. 
Data 
The data that we use are administrative records collected 
by NZES between I October 1988 and 31 December 1997. 
The records contain information on (almost) all spells of 
unemployment and labour market assistance received by 
anyone who enrolled with NZES during this period. This 
provides us with a deta iled. and often sobering record of 
what are in many cases extensive interactions with NZES. 
Gobbi and Rea 's paper in this volume provides a sum-
mary of the data. and discusses patterns of duration and 
multiple spells of unemployment. 
We group different fom1s of labour market assistance into 
tive types - referrals to job vacancies: NZES interviews 
with job-seekers: wage subsidies: training. and work ex-
perience courses. The stated objectives of the specific 
programmes that were offered during the period covered 
by this study vary greatly. They range from building self-
esteem, to placing job-seekers into full-time unsubsidised 
employment. The overall logic of the interventions was 
to move job-seekers closer to employment. Job-seeker 
needs are heterogeneous. There was therefore a range of 
forms of assistance on offer. and different expectations of 
what each could achieve. 
The current paper considers only one measure of the ef-
fectiveness of the interventions - whether the receipt of 
assistance reduced the time that the job-seeker subse-
quently spent either unemployed or in receipt of some form 
of active labour market assistance (described loosely as 
'contact' with NZES ). The specific outcome measure used 
for most of the results is the number of weeks of contact 
with NZES in the 36 months after assistance commences. 
The major weakness with this outcome measure is that we 
do not know whether a lack of contact means that the job-
seeker is in employment or has left the labour market. 
The main results in the paper relate to interventions that 
commenced in the ftrst quarter of 1993. This period was 
chosen because it is mid-way through the period that the 
dataset covers, and therefore allows us to observe job-seek-
ers for a number of years both before and after receiving 
assistance. 
The dataset contains a range of observable characteristics 
of each job-seeker, measured at the beginning of a spel1 of 
unemployment or assistance. These variables are captured 
as sets of indicator (dummy) variables, and one dummy 
variable is omitted for each set of characteristics, to avoid 
perfect collinearity. The included observable characteris-
tics are: 
• Age: [15- 19; 20-24; 25-29; 30-39; 40-49; 50+] 
• Education: [No formal school qualifications; fewer 
than 3 School Cenificate subjects; 3 or more School 
Cenificate subjects; sixth form cenificate/ UE; other 
school qualifications; post-secondary or trade quali-
fications; degree or professional qualifications] 
• Ethnicity: [NZ European/ Pakeha; Sole Maori; Mixed 
Maori; Pacific Islands peoples; Other] 
• Location: [Nonhland; Auckland North; Auckland 
Central; Auckland South; Waikato; East Coast: Bay 
of Plenty; Central; Taranaki; Wellington; Nelson; 
Canterbury; Southern: Not recorded] 
• Occupation: NZES occupation codings for preferred 
occupation 
• Barriers: Psychiatric disability; physical disability; 
intellectual disability; Education/ learning/ literacy/ 
ESOL barrier; Alcohol and drugs barrier; Multiple 
disability; no barrier 
In addition, we calculate summary measures of the job-
seeker 's prior contact with NZES. For this. we include 
the number of weeks of unemployment in the previous 36 
months, the duration of the current spel1 of unemployment. 
and indicator variables for each form of assistance, indi-
cating whether the job-seeker received that form of assist-
ance in the previous 36 months. These ''history" variables 
raise the explanatory power of the regression equations by 
about 5 percentage points above what is explained by other 
personal characteristics. Generally, around 15 percent of 
the variation in outcomes is accounted for by the regres-
sion models. 
The ' treatment ' group is selected by identifying aJl job-
seekers who commenced a spell in receipt of a particular 
form of labour market assistance during the fLJ'St quarter 
of 1993. There is a different treatment group selected for 
each type of assistance. The comparison group is selected 
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Figure 1. An Effective Intervention 
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trea1ment group weeks of contac1 (0. then 70% e~ment) 
by identify ing all job-seekers who were registered as un-
employed mid-way through the ftrSt quarter of 1993 and 
who did not receive any form of assistance during that 
quarter. The same comparison group is used for the analy-
sis of all forms of treatment. In order to ease the computa-
tional burden, we randomly select a sample of compari 
son observations. 
Does the Type of Assistance Matter? 
Figure One illustrates the way that we think about pro-
gramme effectiveness. The horizontal axis measures cal-
endar time (in weeks). The vertical axis measures the cu-
mulative number of weeks of contact time for each group. 
The darkest line represents the experience of the compari-
son group. For simplicity, they are shown as spending 40 
percent ef their time in employment. After I 0 weeks of 
calendar time, they have therefore had 6 weeks of contact 
with NZES. In contrast, the lighter solid line shows the 
experience of a treatment group that receives I 0 weeks of 
assistance. After 10 weeks of calendar time, they have 
spent all I 0 weeks in contact with NZES. 
In order for the intervention to be effective, it must im-
prove the employment chances of the treated group. In 
the graph, we assume that, following the assistance, the 
treatment group spend 70 percent of their time in employ-
ment. They therefore accumulate contact time more slowly 
than does the comparison group. After about 23 weeks, 
the Lines cross, indicating that The dotted line on the 
graph shows the difference in contact time between treat-
ment and comparison groups. A negative number indi-
. ..... 
.. . . 
. 
COfTll3nSOn group weeks of contact (40% er11'10yment) • · · · · · Treatment effect I 
cates that the treatment group has experienced fewer weeks 
of contact, which is a favourable outcome. As noted above. 
the main outcome measure used in this paper is the net 
difference in contact time after 3 years (156 weeks). 
Table Two summarises the number of observations in each 
of the treatment and comparison groups, and shows the 
average outcome for each group. For instance, the ftrSt 
row shows that there were 59.767 referrals to vacancies 
during the quarter. On average. those receiving referrals 
spent 51.8 weeks of the following 36 months either unem-
ployed or in receipt of some fom1 of assistance. In con-
trast, the comparison group spent 76 weeks of the follow-
ing 36 months in contact with NZES. The difference of 
24.2 weeks is a combination of the programme effect, and 
the selection effect (those who were referred to vacancies 
had better prospects than those who were not referred, even 
before the referral). It would be na"ive to attribute all of 
the 24.2 week difference in outcomes to the referral. 
Similarly, it would be na"ive to infer from the other results 
in the right-most column of Table Two that training in-
creases subsequent contact time by 19 weeks. work expe-
rience by 16.1 weeks, and interviews by 6 weeks. AU of 
these forms of assistance were targeted to disadvantaged 
job-seekers. whom we would expect to have more weeks 
of contact time. The raw difference between outcomes 
for the subsidy treatment and control groups may appear a 
little surprising, given that subsidies too are targeted to 
disadvantaged job-seekers. 
Note that the contact time measured in our outcome vari-
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Table 2. Summary of interventions- 1993Ql Intervention Cohort 
Vacancies Interviews Subsidies Training Work 
Sample size 
Treatment group (#) 59767 32285 
Comparison group (# ) 20644 20644 
Outcome = weeks of contact in subsequent 3 years 
Treatment group 51.8 82 
Comparison group 76 76 
Raw diff -24.2 6 
able includes the time spent in receipt of the treatment. 
For instance, the 10.8 fewer weeks of contact that the sub-
sidy treatment group received occurred despite the fact 
that the average duration on subsidy was 21.1 weeks. For 
work experience assistance, the raw difference of 16.1 more 
weeks of contact was around the same as the average length 
of assistance ( 16.5 weeks). The raw difference for train-
ing interventions was 19.0, compared with an average 
course len!!th of I 0.4 weeks. 
~ 
There are reasons other than selection bias to be wary of 
interpreting the raw outcome differences in Table Two. 
For instance. the treatment and control groups are selected 
in different ways. As noted above. the treatment group is 
selected on the basis of job-seekers starting a spell of as-
sistance. This is termed ' flow-sampling '. The compari-
son group is selected on the basis of being unemployed at 
a particular point in time. This is commonly referred to as 
'stock-sampling' . It is a standard result in duration analy-
sis that average duration in a stock-sampled sample is 
higher than that in a flow-sampled sample. It is hard to 
tell a priori which way the sampling methods bias the re-
sults in our particular application. Most of the treatments 
(with the exception of vacancy referrals) are targeted at 
longer duration job-seekers. The stock sampling of the 
comparison group gives more weight to job-seekers with 
longer duration. 
Any sensible comparison of outcomes for treatment and 
comparison groups must take account of duration compo-
sition. Similarly. training assistance is understandably tar-
geted to job-seekers with relatively low levels of qualifi-
cations. so we need to allow for the different qualification 
protiles of treatment and comparison groups, at least to 
the extent that they are related to outcomes or receipt of 
treatment. In practice, we wish to control for a broad range 
of observable attributes that may differ between treatment 
and comparison groups. 
The first method used to control for these differences is 
linear regression. The outcome variable (weeks of con-
tact during a three-year period ) is modelled as a linear 
function of observable characteristics. The regression is 
estimated using a sample of observations on the compari-
son group. and on a selected treatment group. An indica-
tor variable is added to the regression to capture whether 
the observation is for a comparison or treatment spell. The 
• exJ!!:rtence 
7988 12576 1786 
20644 20644 20644 
65.2 95 92.1 
76 76 76 
- 10.8 19 16.1 
estimated coefficient on this indicator (y in the following 
equation) represents the mean difference in outcomes be-
tween the treatment and comparison groups, allowing for 
differences in characteristics (X ) and the average relation-
ship that exists between the observable characteristics and 
the outcome (Y ). In the notation introduced in the meth-
ods section of t~is paper. our estimate of the (unobserved) 
E[Y j_Q 11 is the predicted outcome for someone who 
has t-Yte same characteristics as an assisted job-seeker but 
who did not receive assistance. The regression implicitly 
puts more weight on characteristics that are strongly re-
lated to outcomes. 
Y = a+ 'VI"\. + x.n +E. I JL'I l tJ I (2) 
where: i indexes observations, 
Y is the outcome variable (weeks of contact in 3 
I 
years) 
X. is a vector of observable characteristics on 
I 
observation i (as listed in the data section above. 
D; is an indicator (dummy) variable that equals 
one for a treatment group observation and zero 
for a comparison group observation. 
Table 3 presents estimates of the parameter y for various 
regressions of this form. The first row reports estimates 
from regressions that do not contain any observable char-
acteristics. The estimate is the same as the mean differ-
ence reponed in the right-most column of Table Two. The 
second row reports estimates of the parameter y from re-
gressions containing a full set of covariates (X s). Each of 
the numbers in Table Three is from a separate ;regression. 
Numbers in the same row use the same treatment group 
(the comparison group is always the same). Numbers in 
the same column use the same regression specification. 
By comparing the estimates from the flfst row (na'ive esti-
mates) with those from the second row (regression esti-
mates), we get an indication of the size and direction of 
selection bias. The most pronounced change is for the 
estimate of the effect of referrals to vacancies. The esti-
mated impact drops from -24.2 weeks, to -7.9 weeks. This 
implies that a good deal of the initial favourable estimated 
impact is due to the fact that the sort of job-seekers who 
were referred to vacancies had characteristics associated 
with good outcomes. This is conflfll1ed by examining av-
erage characteristics of the vacancy treatment and corn-
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Table 3. Estimated impacts of interventions (Total and for selected subgroups) 
Dependent Variable: Outcomes in the 36 months after the reference date 
Vacancies Interviews Subsidies Training Work Exl!erience 
Total 
Naive estimate (raw -24.2 6.0 -10.9 19.0 16.1 
difference) (0.4) (0.4) (0.6) (0.6) 1.3) 
Regression Estimate -7.9 8.6 -6.2 20.1 15.1 
(0.4) (0.5) (0.7) (0.7) (1.2) 
Propensity Estimate - 11.7 6.3 - 13.9 18.8 14.6 
(0.8) (1.1) (3.3) (2.0) (1.3) 
Sub-groups (propensity es timates) 
Gender 
Male -11.5 3.6 -13.0 11.6 12.9 
( 1.2) ( 1.7) (3.4) (1.7) ( 1.6) 
Female -11.4 7.6 -7.3 24.2 19.0 
( 1.5) ( 1.8) (2. 1) (2.5) (2.1) 
Ethnicity 
Maori - l l.6 8.1 -6.5 24.7 12.0 
( 1.5) (1.6) (2.0) (2. 1) (2. 1) 
Pacific Peoples -9.2 12.8 -7.2 15.5 17.9 
(2.7) (2.8) (4.3) (4.2) (6.0) 
Qualifications 
Low qualifications (les~ - 13.2 6.0 -11.9 17.6 10.8 
than UE) ( 1.3) ( 1.5) (2. 1) (3. 1) ( 1.7) 
High qualifications (UE -11.9 5.3 -1 1.2 16.0 15.9 
or above (2.4) (5. 1) (3.5) (2.4) (3.0) 
Unemployment Duration 
0-13 weeks -12.0 0.8 -26.9 4.30 14.8 
(4.3) (10.8) (27 . I) ( 10.7) (3.6) 
13-26 weeks -4.3 5.1 J.() 22.6 12.6 
( 1.9) (6.9) (2.9) (3.7) (3.3) 
26-52 wee.ks -6.5 11.4 0.8 16.3 22.0 
(4.3) (2. 1) (3.1) (10,0) (4.3) 
52-104 weeks -2.7 15.6 -8.6 3.4 15.9 
(2.4) (5.6) (2.6) (3. 1) (3.6) 
104+ weeks -7.0 -1.3 -17.2 0.4 11.0 
(2.0) (2.3) (2.8) (3.0) (4.1) 
weeks of "any contact" weeks of registered unemployment 
Location 
Northland -16.2 5.6 -10.6 13.3 8.9 
(6.4) (4.7) (4.3) (7.0) (6.2) 
North Auckland -16.2 3.4 -6.7 20.9 21.2 
(3.2) (4.0) (4.7) (5.2) (7.6) 
Auckland Central -10.9 0. 1 -8.7 12.2 18.3 
(4.5) (3.9) (3.4) (3.9) (7.8) 
South Auckland -11.0 7.8 1.4 17.7 18.0 
(3. 1) (3.5) (3.3) (0.7) (5.2) 
Wnikato -8.9 8.8 1.6 20.2 17.0 
(3.3) (3.5) (4.0) (3. 7) (5.6) 
Central - 12.0 9.9 1.2 25.2 21.1 
(4.4) (3.8) (4.3) (5. 1) (7.2) 
Bay of Plenty -1.8 I 1.3 -9.0 25.4 7.2 
(2.4) (3.6) (3.4) (4.3) (5.3) 
East Coast -8.8 - 1.2 -13.4 12.5 32.6 
. 
(3.7) (4.2) (4.6) (5.6) (7.0) 
Taranaki 
-23.0 3.6 -15.9 8.3 17.9 
(3.3) (5.4) (4.l!) (4.0) (8.6) 
Wellington -9.9 3.8 -20.0 20. 1 9.3 
(3.2) (3.5) ( 13.0) (4.5) (9.4) 
Nelson -7.5 3.1 -19.4 23.8 29.9 
(3.0) (5. 1) (5.9) (5. 1) (12.7 
Canterbury -14.3 11.8 -6.5 16.8 13.8 
(3.3) (4.7) (3.0) (5.6) (4.8) 
Southern 
-6.4 11.4 -16.7 12.9 11.3 
(2.9) (3.6) (7.7) (4.0) (4.2) 
Notes: Each cell in this table is from a separate OLS regression. Cells in the same column relate to the same type of 
intervention. Cells in the same row share a common sample definition - comprising the treatment and comparison 
groups for the sub-population listed in the ftrst column. 
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parison groups. The treatment group, for instano.e, has 
much lower average unemployment duration. This is likely 
to be due both to actual differences in the sort. of job-seek-
ers who are referred to vacancies, and also to the way that 
the sampling was done, as noted above. We rely on the 
regression method to remove both of these effects. 
The removal of selection effects makes less of a differ-
ence for estimates of the impact of the other forms of as-
sistance. Using regression to control for difference.s in 
characteristics generally reduces the estimated effect of 
interventions in reducing subsequent contact time. Subsi-
dies are estimated to reduce subsequent contact by 6.2 
weeks over the 3 years following assistance, compared with 
the raw estimate of 10.9 weeks. Interviews and training 
are followed by a larger number of contact weeks (8.6 and 
20. 1 respectively, compared with the naive estimates of 
6.0 and 19.0). Episodes of work experience are estimated 
to result in 15.1 more weeks of contact, which is insignifi-
cantly different from the naYve estimate of 16. 1 weeks. 
The third row of Table 3 contains estimates based on pro-
pensity matching. Instead of modelling outcomes, as was 
done for the regression modelling just described, propen-
sity matching relies on modelling the probability (or 'pro-
pensity' ) that a job-seeker receives assistance. The ftrst 
step in deriving a propensity-matched estimate is to calcu-
late the propensity score. Using the same defmition of 
treatment and comparison groups as used for the regres-
sion matching, we estimate the probability that each ob-
servation is in the treatment group. To do this, we use a 
logistic regression, with the .full set of covariates as uSed 
for regression matching. We can then compare outcomes 
for those in the treatment group with outcomes for those 
in the comparison group who were most likely to receive 
assistance (but did not). 3 
Figure 2 helps to illustrate the method. Having obtained a 
predicted probability of treatment for each observation, 
we can rank job-seekers according to this prediction. The 
horizontal axis is the predicted probability, or propensity 
score. The two lower lines (using the right axis) show the 
densities for the treatment and comparison samples - the 
proportion of each sample with a particular propensity 
score. 4 The dotted line shows that the treatment group is 
concentrated at the right of the graph, with high probabili-
ties of being treated. The comparison group is more evenly 
spread across predicted probabilities. The tre,atment gtoup 
accounts for 74.3 percent of the full sample, so the regres-
sion-matching coefficients are strongly weighted towards 
the treatment group. The weighting for the propensity 
matched estimate is based on the density of the treatment 
group. The most weight is therefore given to outcome 
differences between those in the treatment and compari-
son groups with treatment propensities of around ten per-
cent and sixty percent. 
Figure 2. Propensity Score estimation for Vacancies 
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20% 
The formula for the propensity matched estimate is thus a 
weighted average of the form: 
(1) 
where si = the i 'th distinct propensity score; 
~; = the difference in outcomes between 
treatment and comparison groups with 
propensity score si; 
~ = the proportion of the Treatment 
group that has propensity score si 
The line in the centre of the graph, labelled "difference in 
outcome" is the difference between outcomes for treat-
ment and comparison groups with the same propensity 
score. The lightly doned line at around -12 weeks is the 
weighted average of these differences, using the density 
of the treatment group as weights. 
The difference in outcomes does not differ greatly across 
different propensity scores. Referral to vacancies appears 
to have the same favourable effect on subsequent outcomes 
regardless of how likely a job-seeker is to be referred to 
vacancies. There appears to be little evidence that those 
who ar~ referred to vacancies are those who are likely to 
benefit most. 
The third row of Table 3 contains propensity estimates of 
the effects ofthe different types of interventions. The pat-
terns are broadly similar to the regression estimates. Our 
preferred method of controlling for differences in charac-
teristics produces point estimates that are uniformly more 
favourable than the regression estimates. The propensity 
estimates show greater reductions, or smaller increases in 
subsequent contact time. 
It is clear from both the regression and propensity esti-
mates that the different forms of intervention have quite 
different effects on subsequent contact time. Referrals to 
vacancies and the receipt of wage subsidies are the only 
forms of intervention associated with lower levels of sub-
sequent contact. As noted earlier, not all interventions are 
designed to or expected to reduce the amount of subse-
quent contact or assistance that job-seekers receive. Some 
• forms of assistance serve largely to prepare recipients for 
other forms of assistance. A positive coefficient does not 
necessarily mean that the assistance is ineffective - it does 
mean that it does not have the effect of reducing subse-
quent contact time over a limited (three year) period. 
Do the Jobseeker 's Characteristics Matter? 
In one sense, job-seeker characteristics do maner. The 
likelihood of receiving any particular form of assistance, 
or the expected number of weeks of contact, are defmitely 
related to job-seeker characteristics. It is these relation-
ships that we use in the regression and propensity meth-
ods to allow us to estimate treatment effects.5 
However, when we look at the effect of different forms of 
assistance, observable characteristics do not appear to 
matter as much, at least not in any systematic way. While 
there are some differences in estimated effects for differ-
ent sub-groups, the general pattern of effects across dif-
ferent forms of assistance holds for most of the groups 
considered. What differences there are between sub-groups 
are often not statistically significant. 
The remainder of Table Three presents propensity esti-
mates based on separate samples of job-seekers with par-
ticular characteristics- by ethnicity. qualifications, unem-
ployment duration, and location. 
The fourth and fifth rows of the table show results for males 
and females separately. A male treatment group is com-
pared with a male comparison groups, and a female treat-
ment group is compared with a female comparison group. 
This method allows the estimated relationship between 
observable characteristics and the probability of selection 
to be different for males and females, as well as allowing 
the effects of treatment to differ. The effect of assistance 
in reducing subsequent contact appears to be stronger for 
males than for females. The male results show consist-
ently larger reductions or smaller increases than the re-
sults for females, although only for training is the differ-
ence statistically significant. 
There are no strong patterns of differing effects for differ-
ent ethnic or qualifications groups. Results are generally 
most favourable for long duration (104 weeks or more) 
job-seekers, although there is not a clear universal dura-
tion gradient.6 The results across NZES regions vary 
widely. The ranges of estimates for the different interven-
tions are: vacancies ( -1.8 to -23.0). interviews ( -1.2 to 11.8), 
subsidies (-20.0 to 1.6), training (8.3 to 25.4), and work 
experience (7.2 to 32.6). 
Does The Labour Market Matter? 
It is plausible to expect that the effect of interventions in 
reducing subsequent time will vary depending on the state 
of the labour market. It is less clear whether to expect 
interventions to be most effective at reducing subsequent 
contact time in tight or in loose labour markets. Certainly 
we would expect outcomes to be better in a tight labour 
market but this applies to both treatment and comparison 
groups, and our measure of effectiveness is based on the 
difference between the two. We have limited information 
on the links between labour market condit ions and pro-
gramme effects. We rely on variation over time, across 
locations, and between different types of intervention to 
provide indirect and circumstantial evidence on these links. 
Table 4 contains estimates of the effect of assistance on 
subsequent contact time, for cohorts selected in the tirst 
quarter of each year. 7 These data are graphed in Figure 3, 
along with the employment growth rate in the year to March 
for each year. Although estimates are not yet available for 
all years, the pattern at this stage strongly suggests that 
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Table 4. Estimated impacts of interventions (For different periods) 
Dependent Variable: Outcomes in the ~ months after the reference date 
Vacancies Interviews Subsidies Training Work 
Experience 
Year of sample 
(Regression 
estimates) 
1990 -9.6 -2.6 - 13.0 7.2 3.8 
(0.5) (0.5) ( 1.1) ( 1.1) (2.1) 
1991 -1 1.0 -0.2 -16.5 5.3 6.9 
(0.4) (0.4) (0.8) (0.8) (0.0) 
1992 -7.5 -0. 1 -10.0 8.4 6.8 
(0.3) (0.3) (0.5) (0.5) (1.0) 
1993 -5.7 7.0 -3.8 12.6 12.4 
(0.3) (0.4) (0.5) (0.5) (0.8) 
1994 23.9 29.3 22.8 33.7 28.9 
(0.3) (0.3) (0.6) (0.4) (1.0) 
Notes: Each cell in this table is from a separate OLS regression. Cells in the same column relate to the 
same type of intervention. Cells in the same row share a common sample definition - comprising the 
treatment and comparison groups for the sub-population listed in the first column. 
rapid employment growth is associated with longer sub-
sequent contact for the treatment group, relative to the 
companson group. 
Between 1993 and 1994, when the growth in employment 
and the deterioration of the effectiveness of interventions 
was greatest, there was both a drop in the average number 
and a rise in the average weeks of subsequent contact for 
each of the treatment groups. It is possible that the dete-
rioration in outcomes for the treatment groups is a result 
of selection effects. Faced with strong employment growth, 
it may be that those who remained unemployed in 1994 
and 1995, and received assistance, were the hardest to place 
job-seekers. The regression method controls for such se-
lection to the extent that it is evident in observed charac-
teristics, but we have no way of convincingly controlling 
for unobserved heterogeneity.8 
We also inspected the results by location, which were pre-
sented in Table 3 and discussed above, for evidence on a 
Figure 3. Employment Growth and the Effects of Interventions Over Time 
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link between intervention effects and the local labour mar-
ket. Unfortunately, we do not have employment data for 
the regions used for this analysis. Instead, we compared 
the estimated effects with the relative unemployment level 
in each regions.- i.e . number of people unemployed in the 
region, compared with the average level of unemployment 
for that region. There was no discernible pattern of ef-
fects related to the level or the change in unemployment. 
The other piece of circumstantial evidence on the impor-
tance of the labour market is the fact that referrals to va-
cancies and wage subs.idies are the two forms of assist-
ance that lead to the greatest reductions in subsequent con-
tact time. These are also the forms of assistance that are 
dependent on employers being willing to take on an un-
employed worker. 
Other Outcomes 
This fmal section provides some evidence on the extent of 
'staircasing'- interventions may move job-seekers closer 
to work and independence by preparing them to receive 
other forms of assistance for which they are not initially 
ready. This may be an appropriate strategy for some job-
seekers. In terms of our chosen outcome measure, 
staircasing would lead to more rather fewer weeks of sub-
sequent contact. 
As a crude indicator of the degree of staircasing. we re-
port in Table 5 estimates of the effect of past receipt of 
different forms of assistance on the likelihood of receiv-
ing various forms of assistance. The reported estimates 
are the proportional changes in a job-seeker 's likelihood 
of receiving assistance given that the job-seeker received 
a specific form of assistance in the previous three years.9 
There is clear evidence of job-seekers receiving multiple 
spells of the same sort of assistance. For instance. having 
received a subsidy in the past increases your chances of 
receiving one again by 53 percent. The exception is inter-
views, which generally occurred after a set number of 
weeks of unemployment, and are therefore less likely to 
be affected by prior assistance. Having had an interview 
increases the chance of receiving further assistance, which 
is not surprising given that intervie.ws generally entailed 
taking stock of a job-seeker's needs and directing them to 
appropriate assistance. It appears that receiving a sub-
sidy, training. or work experience increases the chance of 
receiving any of those three forms of assistance. The ex-
ception is that subsidies are less likely to be followed by 
further training. 
The results in this section help to shed light on why some 
forms of assistance appear to lead to longer periods of 
subsequent contact. They are not intended to be a sound 
analysis of staircasing. Such an analysis is beyond the 
scope of the current paper. 
Conclusions 
Different forms of active labour market policies have quite 
different effects on the amount of contact that job-seekers 
have with the public employment agency. Referrals to 
vacancies and wage subsidies appear to be most likely to 
reduce subsequent contact time. Other forms of assist-
ance may serve to he lp job-seekers into further assistance 
rather than directly into jobs. 
The effects of interventions on subsequent contact time 
does not appear to vary much according to personal at-
tributes, although there is variation across job-seekers with 
different unemployment duration and across different lo-
cations. The limited data analysed here suggest that inter-
ventions may become less effective when employment 
growth is strong, probably because of the improved pros-
pects for those who are not receiving assistance. 
Future Research 
The research reported in this paper is the result of a sig-
nificant allocation of resources - not only in modelling 
and estimation, but more fundamentally in assembling a 
research database from administrative data. Nevertheless, 
the work done to date has barely scratched the surface of 
what can be learnt from the data. In this section, I briefly 
outline some possible directions for future work. The list 
is far from exhaustive! 
• Updating: For reasons of consistency of data, the cur-
rent study uses data only up until 1997. More recent 
DWI data could be used to analyse more recent pat-
Table 5. Staircasing - Effect of Previous Assistance on Probability of Receiving 
Assistance 
P[Referral to P[lnterview] P[Subsidy) 
vacancy] 
Assistance received in the previous three years 
Referral to vacancy 38% 9% 37% 
Interview 10% -2% 46% 
Subsidy 3% 0% 53% 
Training 0% 8% 24% 
Work Experience 9% 2% 48% 
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terns of effects. 
• Labour market links: Figure 3. suggests a strong link 
between programme effectiveness and employment 
growth, but we do not at this stage understand the rea-
sons for this relationship. Further work is clearly 
needed to understand this issue, and why regional 
patterns show no obvious link to labour market con-
ditions. 5. 
• Intensity of treatment: In the current paper, we do not 
use the information that is available on the length of 6. 
treatment. For instance, subsidies, training. and work 
experience courses vary in length. Future work could 
examine whether longer periods of assistance have 
stronger effects. 
• Other outcome measures: One of the main weaknesses 7. 
of the current dataset is the lack of con fumed labour 
market outcomes - we observe only whether someone 
is still in contact with NZES. Future could supple-
ment the administrative data by collecting outcome 
information from people who are no longer in contact 
with the agency. The impact on wages, employment, 
hours worked, etc. would be particularly valuable. 
Other administrative data, such as benetit records, 
could be used to supplement the data used in this 
project, and provide additional information about 
those who lost contact with NZES. 
• Individual programmes: This study has grouped in-
terventions into generic types. It is possible to ide n- 8. 
tify specitic schemes and programmes. Analysing spe-
cific forms of assistance would allow more careful 
incorporation of rules and practices about who re-
ceived assistance. It could also allow a closer exami-
nation of the features of schemes that appear most 9. 
effective. 
• Staircasing: The curre nt paper has not carefully ana-
lysed patterns of staircasing, or whether particular 
sequences of assistance are more effective than oth-
ers. Given how common it is for assisted job-seekers 
to receive more than one form of assistance. such an 
analysis would be a valuable input into operational 
policy. 
percentage point, so there is a maximum of lOO 
possible distinct values. The approach thus uses 
non-overlapping rectangular kernels of width 0.0 1, 
centred on multiples of 0.0 1. There are many al-
ternative (and arguably superior) ways in the lit-
erature of smoothing estimates across the propen-
sity domain. 
Around 15 percent of the variation of outcomes can 
be accounted for by differences in charcateristics. 
There are relatively few assisted jobseekers in the 
low-duration sub-group, presumably due to dura-
tion being the main targeting criterion. The small 
size of the treatment group is reflected in the large 
standard errors on the coefficients. 
Note that the estimates in Table 4. are not directly 
comparable with the estimates in Table 3., for two 
main reasons. First, the outcome defmition is weeks 
of contact in the rwo years following the start of 
assistance. and controlling for only one year of prior 
intervention experience. The results in Table 3. 
use a period of three years for each of these meas-
ures. This is done to avoid having to drop as many 
years at either end of the sample period. Second, 
the estimates are from regression rather than pro-
pensity estimation. This is due to the fact that the 
propensity estimation is very time-consuming and 
propensity estimates has not yet been completed. 
Methods do exist to adjust for such heterogeneity, 
but generally rely on observing an attribute that is 
related to participation but unrelated to outcomes. 
We were unable to tind such a variable. 
A separate linear probability model is used to esti-
mate the probability of being in each treatment 
group. The model contains a full set of covariates, 
including dummy variables capturing whether the 
job-seeker has received each of the forms of assist-
ance in the previous three years. The reported es-
timate is one plus the ratio of the coefficient on 
each of these dummies to the mean probability of 
being in the treatment groups. This gives an esti-
mate of the proportional change in probability. 
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